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more	 equitable	 criminal	 justice	 system.2	 Although	 sometimes	 over-
looked	in	that	dialogue,	the	fair	operation	of	the	Federal	Rules	of	Evi-
dence	 is	a	crucial	component	 in	ensuring	such	an	equitable	system.	








































In	one	 important	 respect,	 the	 federal	 courts	have	applied	Rule	106	
uniformly.	They	have	properly	interpreted	the	fairness	threshold	for	
invoking	the	Rule	narrowly,	recognizing	the	need	for	completion	only	




















sion	 of	 the	 initial	 denial	 did	 not	 distort	 or	 alter	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	 subsequent	
confession);	United	States	v.	Hird,	901	F.3d	196,	217	(3d	Cir.	2018)	(rejecting	comple-
tion	where	the	excerpt	of	testimony	defendant	sought	to	admit	“occurs	many	pages	

























































which	 is	 a	 rule	 about	 the	 admission	 of	 out-of-court	 statements—
makes	no	mention	of	the	hearsay	rule	that	could	be	held	to	prevent	
completion	with	otherwise	inadmissible	statements.		
This	 incomplete	 rule	 of	 completeness	 has	 left	 federal	 courts	
struggling	for	decades	with	objections	to	oral	statements	and	other-










































































statements]	 in	context,	 to	avoid	misleading	 the	 jury,	or	 to	ensure	 fair	and	 impartial	
understanding”).	
	 18.	 4	 JOHN	HENRY	WIGMORE,	 A	TREATISE	 ON	 THE	ANGLO-AMERICAN	SYSTEM	 OF	EVI-
DENCE	IN	TRIALS	AT	COMMON	LAW	§	2094	(2d	ed.	1923)	(describing	the	famous	seven-












competent	 for	 the	 other	 party	 to	 prove	 their	 version	 of	 it.	.	.	.	 [W]here	 the	
whole	or	a	part	of	a	conversation	has	been	put	in	evidence	by	one	party,	the	
other	party	is	entitled	to	explain,	vary,	or	contradict	it.20	
New	 York’s	 Field	 Code	marked	 the	 first	 attempt	 to	 codify	 the	
broad	common	law	completeness	doctrine	in	1850,	as	follows:	
When	part	of	an	act,	declaration,	conversation	or	writing	is	given	in	evidence	
by	 one	party,	 the	whole	 on	 the	 same	 subject	may	be	 inquired	 into	 by	 the	
other;	when	a	letter	is	read,	the	answer	may	be	given;	and	when	a	detached	
act,	declaration,	conversation	or	writing	is	given	in	evidence,	any	other	act,	





























































	 26.	 4	 WIGMORE,	 supra	 note	 18,	 §	 2113,	 at	 508–09;	 see	 also	 1	 CHRISTOPHER	 B.	
MUELLER	&	LAIRD	C.	KIRKPATRICK,	FEDERAL	EVIDENCE	§	1:42,	at	285	(4th	ed.	2013)	(noting	
that	 completion	 required	 a	 fact-specific	 inquiry	 and	 that	 courts	 considered	 factors	























nent	 during	 cross-examination	 or	 her	 own	 case	was	 commonly	 al-
lowed.34	In	contrast,	courts	were	more	reluctant	to	require	“interrup-



















Considerations	of	 fair	play	demanded	 that	 the	portion	of	 the	conversation	

























mitted	 and	 should	not	 be	used	 as	 substantive	 evidence.40	 But	most	























ders	 “are	 equally	 evidence	 to	 the	 jury”	 as	 prior	 admitted	 statements);	 Michael	 A.	



















With	 respect	 to	 confessions	of	 a	 criminal	defendant¾the	most	












written	 and	 oral	 statements	 first	 presented	 in	 fragmented	 form	by	
their	adversaries.	While	the	courts	employed	numerous	linguistic	for-






mitted	 an	 opponent	 to	 engage	 in	 “optional”	 completeness	 during	

























tation	 of	 a	 thought	 or	 idea	 codified	 the	 common	 law	 conception	 of	


















































own	case,”	 signaling	 that	 common	 law	protections	applicable	 to	 in-
complete	oral	statements	survived	the	codification.57		
In	defining	the	elusive	circumstances	in	which	completion	is	re-











































pleting	 remainders	 that	 would	 otherwise	 constitute	 inadmissible	
hearsay.	Here	too,	the	DOJ	attempted	to	limit	completing	evidence	to	
that	 which	 would	 be	 “otherwise	 admissible,”	 thereby	 allowing	 the	
hearsay	prohibition	to	defeat	completion.63	The	DOJ	formally	sought	











































































































































other	 exclusionary	 principles:	 “[E]xcept	 as	 otherwise	 provided	 by	
these	 rules.”74	 Had	 the	 drafters	 intended	 to	 limit	 the	 admission	 of	











ing	 trials,	 and	 creates	 difficulties	 for	 both	 litigants	 and	 the	 trial	
court.”77		
The	Seventh	Circuit	in	United	States	v.	Haddad	echoed	the	senti-
ments	of	 the	Sutton	 court	 in	holding	 that	a	defendant’s	exculpatory	
statements	should	have	been	admitted	in	the	name	of	completeness.78	
In	that	case,	the	defendant	was	charged	with	being	a	felon	knowingly	
in	 possession	 of	 “one	 Intratec	 TEC–9,	 9	millimeter,	 semi-automatic	
pistol”	after	it	was	found	in	his	apartment	during	the	execution	of	a	
search	warrant.79	During	the	execution	of	the	search	warrant,	the	de-

























The	 defendant	 in	 effect	 said	 “Yes,	 I	 knew	 of	 the	 marijuana	 but	 I	 had	 no	








































accused	 of	 conspiring	 to	 buy	 votes	 and	 of	 helping	 appoint	 corrupt	
members	of	the	Clay	County	Board	of	Elections.85	At	trial,	the	govern-
ment	presented	portions	of	a	phone	recording	in	which	a	cooperating	
witness,	 a	Ms.	White,	 told	 the	 judge	 about	 questions	 she	 had	 been	
asked	during	her	grand	jury	testimony.	White	told	the	judge	that	she	





the	 defendant	 had	 adopted	 the	 accusation	 that	 he	 had	 appointed	
White.	 When	 the	 defendant	 sought	 to	 complete	 the	 government’s	







































erences	 to	 “strong	 Muslim[s].”90	 The	 trial	 court	 refused	 to	 require	
completion	with	comments	the	defendant	posted	suggesting	that	he	
did	“not	support	terrorists.”91	On	appeal,	the	Fourth	Circuit	affirmed,	




trump	 a	 hearsay	 objection,	 it	 is	 also	 in	 apparent	 conflict	 with	 the	
Gravely	opinion	discussed	above¾also	in	the	Fourth	Circuit¾which	



















































manufacturer	 of	 an	 aircraft	 that	 crashed	 during	 training	 exercises,	
killing	his	wife	and	a	student	pilot.	At	trial,	the	husband’s	theory	was	










pilot	 and	 acknowledging	 that	 the	 plane	 violated	 its	 flight	 pattern	
shortly	before	the	crash.	The	husband’s	counsel	sought	to	ask	him	on	
cross-examination	 whether	 the	 same	 report	 also	 concluded	 that	
power	failure	caused	the	crash.	The	defense	promptly	objected	to	the	



















document,	 the	material	 required	 to	dispel	 the	distortion	 is	 relevant	























































































are	simply	describing	their	rationale	 for	allowing	completion	 in	 the	
first	place.	Completion	is	allowed	under	Rule	106	only	when	necessary	























only	 interpretive	 conundrum	 created	 by	 the	 partial	 codification	 of	
completeness	 in	 Rule	 106.	 Federal	 courts	 have	 also	 struggled	with	





























upon	 his	 summary	 in	 answering	 questions	 about	 the	 defendant’s	





can	 be	 traced	 to	 the	 Supreme	 Court’s	 decision	 in	Beech	 Aircraft.114	
Taking	a	page	from	the	Supreme	Court’s	book	on	completion,	courts	








	 112.	 Id.	This	analysis	reveals	yet	another	 interpretive	difficulty	 in	applying	Rule	
106—the	problem	of	classifying	a	statement	originally	made	orally,	but	later	recorded	
in	some	fashion.	By	leaving	oral	statements	out	of	Rule	106,	the	drafters	of	the	original	
provision	 have	 forced	 courts	 to	 draw	 the	 sometimes-awkward	distinction	 between	
“oral”	and	“recorded”	statements.	
	 113.	 Id.	Ultimately,	 the	court	 found	common	 law	completion	 inapplicable	 to	de-
fendant’s	 circumstance	 because	 the	 defendant’s	 oral	 assertions	 of	 innocence	 were	






















amining	witnesses,	 federal	 courts	have	connected	 the	right	 to	com-
plete	oral	statements	with	the	determination	of	“truth.”		
The	 leading	 case	 on	 unrecorded	 statements	 and	 completeness	










argued	 that	 fairness	 required	 admission	 of	 his	 simultaneous	 state-
ment	regarding	ownership.120	The	trial	court	refused	to	admit	the	de-


























































rule	of	 completeness	 for	unrecorded	statements	 that	 is	 the	 same	as	 that	applied	 to	
written	 and	 recorded	 statements	 under	 Rule	 106);	 Lopez-Medina,	 596	 F.3d	 at	 734	
(“[W]e	have	held	‘the	rule	of	completeness	embodied	in	Rule	106	is	“substantially	ap-






















greed,	grounding	 its	analysis	only	 in	 the	 fact	 that	“Rule	106	applies	







rejected	 completeness	 arguments	 with	 respect	 to	 oral	 statements	
based	only	on	the	fact	that	Rule	106	excludes	them	from	coverage.132	
In	United	States	v.	Wilkerson,	 a	panel	of	 the	Fourth	Circuit	 similarly	
disposed	 of	 a	 defendant’s	 completeness	 objection	 relating	 to	 oral	



















recorded	 statements,	 not	 to	 conversations.”133	 In	 United	 States	 v.	
Ramirez-Perez,	the	Eleventh	Circuit	offered	a	particularly	perplexing	




















completion	of	partial	and	distorted	oral	 statements,	 judges	and	 liti-






































pretation	 of	 the	 Rule,	 instead	 resolving	 the	 issue	 on	 common	 law	
grounds.141	
An	important	animating	principle	behind	the	Federal	Rules	of	Ev-


































idence	 Rules	 evaluated	 the	 possibility	 of	 amending	 Rule	 106	 in	
2002.144	In	the	face	of	competing	priorities145	and	relying	on	the	fed-
eral	courts	to	manage	the	issue,	the	Advisory	Committee	exercised	re-
straint	 and	declined	 to	propose	 an	 amendment	 to	Rule	106.146	 The	
federal	courts	have	had	almost	two	additional	decades	to	develop	a	

















rulemaking	 initiatives	 that	 resolve	 circuit	 splits);	 see	 also	 Edward	 Becker	 &	 Aviva	
Orenstein,	The	Federal	Rules	of	Evidence	After	Sixteen	Years—The	Effect	of	“Plain	Mean-
ing”	 Jurisprudence,	 the	Need	 for	an	Advisory	Committee	on	the	Rules	of	Evidence,	and	
Suggestions	for	Selective	Revision	of	the	Rules,	60	GEO.	WASH.	L.	REV.	857	(1992)	(em-






















evidentiary	 landscape	 that	 is	unclear.”148	Other	 federal	 judges	have	
commented	on	the	frequency	with	which	issues	of	completeness	arise	
in	the	heat	of	criminal	trials,	thus	depriving	judges	and	litigants	of	the	





Notably,	 several	 states	 have	 adopted	 evidence	 rules	 governing	
completion	that	deviate	from	Rule	106	and	offer	more	clarity	to	judges	
and	litigants.152	Although	the	Federal	Rules	of	Evidence	were	designed	






















GA.	 CODE	ANN.	 §	 24-8-822	 (2020);	 IOWA	R.	 EVID.	 5.106	 (2016);	 MONT.	R.	 EVID.	 106	
(2019);	NEB.	REV.	STAT.	ANN.	§	27-106	(2020);	N.H.	R.	EVID.	106	(2016);	OR.	REV.	STAT.	
ANN.	§	40.040	(2019);	TEX.	R.	EVID.	106–07	(2020);	WIS.	STAT.	§	901.07	(2019).	
	 153.	 Symposium,	 Association	 of	American	Law	Schools	Annual	Meeting,	 Evidence	




















and	 incomplete	 presentation	 of	 a	 statement.	 The	 decision	 of	 Rule	
106’s	 original	 drafters	 to	maintain	 silence	 on	 this	 critical	 issue	has	
generated	much	of	 the	 confusion	 surrounding	 the	Rule.	An	 amend-






































of	 the	 defendant’s	 completing	 statements	 based	 upon	 controlling	
Sixth	Circuit	precedent	preventing	the	presentation	of	the	defendant’s	






pretation	 defies	 the	 fundamental	 purpose	 of	 the	 Rules	 in	 their	
entirety.	Federal	Rule	of	Evidence	102	makes	clear	that	the	Rules	are	
to	be	construed	 “to	administer	every	proceeding	 fairly”	and	 “to	 the	










otherwise	 inadmissible.161	 Although	 it	 is	 theoretically	 possible	 that	


































letter	 in	 any	 circumstance	where	 the	 parties	 possess	 asymmetrical	
rights	 to	 admit	 an	 out-of-court	 statement	 under	 existing	 hearsay	
rules.	 Completion	 concerns	most	 commonly	 arise	 in	 those	 circum-
stances	where	the	risk	of	abuse	is	most	serious:	when	the	government	
seeks	 to	 present	 a	 criminal	 defendant’s	 incriminating	 statements	
without	including	exculpatory	portions.164	Due	to	the	one-way	admis-
sibility	of	party-opponent	statements	under	Federal	Rule	of	Evidence	



















































	 166.	 See	STEPHEN	A.	SALTZBURG,	MICHAEL	M.	MARTIN	&	DANIEL	 J.	CAPRA,	 4	 FEDERAL	
RULES	OF	EVIDENCE	MANUAL	§	801.02	(2020)	(“The	touchstone	of	admissibility	is	that	
the	statement	 is	beneficial	 to,	and	offered	by,	 the	speaker’s	opponent	at	 the	time	of	

























the	Evidence	Rules,	 there	 is	no	 reason	why	an	exception	cannot	be	
found	within	those	rules	but	outside	of	Article	8.		












































view,	a	defendant	 could	correct	 the	 record	by	 taking	 the	 stand	and	
subjecting	 himself	 to	 cross-examination,	 rendering	 admission	
through	Rule	106	unnecessary.	
This	 “testimony”	 remedy	 for	 a	misleading	 presentation	 by	 the	
prosecution	in	a	criminal	case	is	flawed	for	many	reasons.	First,	the	
















to	 testify	 and	 subject	 himself	 to	 cross-examination¾including	 im-
peachment	with	prior	convictions¾just	 to	correct	a	misleading	 im-
pression	 purposely	 created	 by	 the	 government.177	 Finally,	 and	
 
statements	“he	must	do	so	by	taking	the	stand	and	testifying	himself”	because	“Federal	



































unrestricted	 flow	 of	 previously	 inadmissible	 hearsay	 evidence	 into	
the	trial	process.	Rule	106	contains	important	threshold	requirements	
that	operate	as	substantial	limits	on	the	consequences	of	any	amend-
ment.	 As	 explored	 above,	 Rule	 106	 authorizes	 completion	 of	 state-
ments	only	when	“fairness”	requires	it.181	Although	they	are	divided	





application	of	 the	 ‘fairness’	 requirement”	will	prevent	 any	abuse	of	
Rule	106	“because	 judges	should	restrict	application	of	Rule	106	to	
those	 situations	 where	 misleading	 information	 actually	 was	 intro-
duced	.	.	.	and	allow	only	such	correcting	evidence	as	is	necessary	to	















































































terial	 on	 the	 same	 subject	 as	 previously	 disclosed	material.188	 Rule	
502(a)	provides	that	a	waiver	of	privilege	extends	to	additional	undis-
closed	matter	when	the	original	waiver	was	“intentional,”	when	the	
disclosed	 and	 undisclosed	 information	 concern	 the	 “same	 subject	
matter,”	 and	 when	 “they	 ought	 in	 fairness	 to	 be	 considered	 to-
gether.”189	The	“fairness”	standard	in	Rule	502(a)	was	modeled	after	























































ponent	 prefers	 to	 exclude	 the	 otherwise	 inadmissible	 completing	
hearsay,	she	retains	the	unilateral	authority	to	keep	it	out	of	evidence	
 
	 190.	 See	FED.	R.	EVID.	502(a)	advisory	committee’s	note	 (“[T]hus,	 subject	matter	






























truth	 and	 nothing	 but	 the	 truth.	 Furthermore,	 the	 statements	 of	 a	
criminal	 defendant	 are	 admissible	 against	 him	 pursuant	 to	 Rule	
801(d)(2)(A)	in	the	first	place,	not	because	they	are	reliable,	but	be-
cause	adversarial	fairness	requires	a	person	to	answer	for	his	own	ut-





does	 not	 mean	 that	 the	 original	 proponent¾usually	 the	 prosecu-






say	 statements	 made	 by	 such	 an	 unavailable	 declarant	 to	 be	 admitted	 against	 the	
wrongdoer.	Id.	Rule	106	would	provide	a	more	limited,	but	proportional,	remedy	by	
denying	a	hearsay	objection	to	a	party	that	proffers	a	misleading	statement	that	can	be	
completed	with	 hearsay.	 See	 FED.	R.	EVID.	 801(d)(1)(B)	 (allowing	 the	 admission	 of	
prior	consistent	statements	for	their	truth	only	if	the	opponent	impeaches	the	declar-
ant	in	accordance	with	the	exception).	



























ard	 simply	 because	 they	 are	 hearsay	 and	 should	 expressly	 permit	
completion	with	statements	that	would	otherwise	be	inadmissible.		
2. The	Truth	of	the	Matter—the	Context	Alternative	














mitting	 completing	 statements	 for	 the	 same	 purpose	 as	 the	
 





































































fered	 to	 rehabilitate	 impeached	 testifying	 witnesses.203	 The	 Court	
found	that	a	majority	of	courts	required	a	prior	consistent	statement	
to	have	been	made	before	any	motive	to	fabricate	with	which	the	wit-































































ignore	 the	 completing	portion	altogether.	 Such	a	 jury	would	be	 left	
with	the	inference	that	the	defendant	had	the	gun	at	the	time	of	the	
murder.	Thus,	a	defendant	who	may	not	argue	the	truth	of	his	contem-





























federal	 completion	 doctrine	 reveals	 another	 defect	with	 a	 “context	
only”	amendment	 to	Rule	106.	Such	an	amendment	would	anoint	a	
distinctly	minority	view	of	completion	as	the	uniform	federal	rule.	The	
majority	 of	 federal	 courts	 admit	 completing	 statements	 that	would	
otherwise	be	hearsay	under	the	current	version	of	Rule	106	without	
limiting	the	use	to	which	they	may	be	put.211	Other	federal	courts	ex-
clude	 such	 statements	 altogether.212	 Only	 one	 circuit	 has	 expressly	
provided	 that	 completing	 statements	 should	 be	 admitted	 for	 their	





































original	 partial	 statement	 was	 offered	 only	 for	 its	 non-hearsay	
value¾perhaps	in	showing	the	effect	of	the	statement	on	some	party	
to	the	litigation	who	heard	the	statement¾then	limiting	the	complet-





on	 the	 party,	 a	 similar	 limitation	 on	 the	 completing	 portion	 of	 the	








































should	 allow	 the	 admission	 of	 such	 completing	 statements	 for	 the	

































































law	because	 the	Rules	 contain	Rule	106,	 a	 provision	 that	 codifies	 a	
completion	right	for	written	and	recorded	statements.	In	other	areas	

















ample,	 the	defendant	 specifically	 relied	on	 the	 common	 law	rule	of	
completeness	to	argue	that	an	exculpatory	portion	of	his	oral	state-
ment	 should	 have	 been	 admitted.	 Notwithstanding	 the	 Supreme	






































































































with	 a	prior	 oral	 statement	might	deny	having	made	 it.	 In	 fact,	 the	










mit	 the	 completion	of	misleading	partial	 oral	 statements	under	 the	
 


















































































ject	may	be	 inquired	 into	by	an	adverse	party	 .	.	.	.”);	CONN.	CODE	EVID.	 §	1-5	 (2018)	
(“When	a	statement	is	introduced	by	a	party,	the	court	may,	and	upon	request	shall,	





























oral	 statements.242	 In	 State	 v.	 Eugenio,243	 the	 Wisconsin	 Supreme	
Court	 acknowledged	 that	 the	 fairness	 rationale	 supporting	 comple-






law	 of	 New	 Hampshire	 that	 permits	 the	 completion	 of	 oral	 state-
ments.246		
The	reported	cases	in	the	state	jurisdictions	that	have	embraced	



































































	 248.	 See,	 e.g.,	 CONN.	CODE	EVID.	 Sec.	 1-5(b)	 commentary	 (“Unlike	 subsection	 (a),	











































The	 Advisory	 Committee	 note	 should	 also	 instruct	 judges	 and	









Finally,	 despite	 all	 the	 alterations	 to	 Rule	 106	 that	 such	 an	



























“Partial	 codification”	 has	 led	 to	 a	 court	 finding	 that	 the	 completion	
right	 is	 lost	 if	 not	 advanced	 contemporaneously,	 a	 holding	 that	 ap-
pears	to	be	inconsistent	with	the	intent	of	the	drafters	to	create	a	right	

















to	 provide	 a	meaningful	 remedy	 for	 a	misleading	presentation	of	 a	
statement.		
	
